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THE BRAIN AND THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES
Anne Harrington
Theincreasingvisibilityandsenseofintellectualopportunityassociatedwith
neuroscience in recent years have in turn stimulated a growing interest in its
past. For the ﬁrst time, a general reference book on the history of science has
seen ﬁt to include a review of the history of the brain and behavioral sciences
as a thread to be reckoned with within the broader narrative tapestry. On
the one hand, this looks like a welcome sign that a new historical subﬁeld
has “come of age.” On the other hand, when one settles down to the task
of composing a “state of the art” narrative, one realizes just how much these
are still early days. The bulk of available secondary literature still swims in
a space between nostalgic narratives of great men and moments, big “march
of ideas” overviews, and an unsystematic patchwork of more theorized for-
ays by professional historians into speciﬁc themes (e.g., phrenology, brain
localization, reﬂex theory).1
The challenge of imagining a comprehensive narrative is made all the
more formidable by the fact that we are dealing here with a history that
resistsanyeasyorcleancontainmentwithindisciplinaryconﬁnes.Thepaper
trail of ideas, experiments, clinical innovations, institutional networks, and
high-stakessocialdebatesnotonlymovesacrossobvioussitesofactivitysuch
as neurology, neurosurgery, and neurophysiology but also traverses ﬁelds as
1 Among exceptions or partial exceptions, Roger Smith’s historiographically thoughtful Fontana His-
tory of the Human Sciences (London: Fontana, 1997) embeds questions about the brain–behavior
relationship within a larger argument about what could constitute a history of the “human sciences,”
which Smith actively resists reducing to a story about biologically oriented natural sciences. Also
useful is an expansive and exuberant overview of just those same sciences by an “insider” in the ﬁeld:
see Stanley Finger, Origins of Neuroscience: A History of Explorations into Brain Function (New York:
OxfordUniversityPress,1994).Beyondthat,thereisthegreat,ifhistoriographicallyuneven,tomeby
Edwin Clarke and Stephen Jacyna, Nineteenth-Century Origins of Neuroscientiﬁc Concepts (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1987).
ThischapterisalsoindebtedtothecontributionsofHannahLandeckeroftheScience,Technology,and
Society Program at MIT, who worked with me assiduously through the conceptualization and partial
drafting of earlier versions. Because she was less involved in the last stages, including the ﬁnal writing,
of this chapter, she, with characteristic humility and integrity, asked me not to list her as coauthor.
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(only apparently) distinct as medicine, evolution, social theory, psychology,
asylum management, genetics, philosophy, linguistics, anthropology, com-
puter science, and theology.
We are also dealing with a history that challenges us to engage one of
the largest questions that may be asked by historians: What has been the
outcomeoftheeffortbyhumanbeingsoverthepasttwocenturiestoapplythe
categories of scientiﬁc understanding to themselves – beings caught between
a universe of social and moral realities and a universe that seems to stand
outside of such realities and that they have learned to call “natural”? On
all sorts of levels, our fractured understandings of ourselves meet and jostle
together uneasily in this history, and any approach that fails to recognize this
will in some fundamental sense miss the point.
GHOSTS AND MACHINES: DESCARTES, KANT,
AND BEYOND
Questionsofwheretobeginastoryarealwayscontested,andwehavechosen
to discover a “beginning” to the history of the brain and behavioral sciences
in the seventeenth century, the time when the new natural philosophers of
Europe had begun to converge on a model of a universe in which everything
appeared capable of being accounted for in terms of matter and motion and
described using the language of mathematical geometry; everything, that is,
except perhaps those same philosophers themselves – those little spots of
consciousness that peered through telescopes, scribbled calculations, pon-
dered inﬁnity, and longed for immortality, all while living inside a body that
decayed,grewsick,andcouldberendereddeadwithoutamoment’swarning.2
Howwasthescientisttounderstandtheplaceofhisownconsciousmindin
aworldofmatterandmotion?Didhissoulalonetranscendthephysicallaws
of the universe, interacting with the body (perhaps via a speciﬁc location, or
special “seat”), while itself remaining untouched by the ravages of mortality
and the prison cell of mechanical determinism? The notorious mind–body
dualism of Ren´ e Descartes – about which more ink has been spilled than
can begin to be reviewed here – appeared to offer this promise.3 Descartes’
“ghost in the machine” (as Gilbert Ryle would much later famously mock
it) began with a reﬂex model of physiology to account for most intelligent
functionsinhumansandallintelligentfunctionsinanimals4 butthenposited
2 Steven Shapin, The Scientiﬁc Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
3 Some useful recent studies include: Marleen Rozemond, “Descartes’s Case for Dualism,” Journal of
the History of Philosophy, 33 (1995), 29–64; Timothy J. Reiss, “Denying the Body? Memory and the
Dilemmas of History in Descartes,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 57 (1996), 587–608.
4 Certainly reﬂex theory is invariably conventionally depicted as having its “origins” with Descartes.
Georges Canguilhem has argued, however, that this is a retroactive construction of origins, which
began after the establishment of mechanist theory around 1850. He credits the notion instead toP1: JYD
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the existence in human beings alone of “something else” – a kind of pure
thinking substance or rational soul that was able to move the body directly,
at will, via the so-called animal spirits. The machine-body interacted with
this soul, but the soul was the ﬁnal authority in all volitional psychological
events. “The will is so free in its nature that it can never be constrained,”
Descartes asserted.
But how creditable was this idea? In the eighteenth century, the French
philosopher Voltaire would ask sardonically how it was that the great New-
tonian heavens conform without exception to the commands of physical law
but there remains in the universe “a little creature ﬁve feet tall, acting just as
he pleases, solely according to his own caprice.”5
Indeed, in the early twentieth century, the philosopher Alfred North
Whitehead would reﬂect on the incoherences inherent within that origi-
nal Cartesian vision of a dualistic universe and the enduring problems they
had made for future efforts to think well about human minds and the living
world.
During the seventeenth century there evolved the scheme of scientiﬁc ideas
which has dominated thought ever since. It involves a fundamental duality,
with material on the one hand, and on the other hand mind. In between
therelietheconceptsoflife,organism,function,instantaneousreality,inter-
action,orderofnature,whichcollectivelyformtheAchillesheelofthewhole
system.6
Some people went on the offensive against Descartes early on. In the mid-
eighteenth century, the French physician and philosopher Julien Offray de
la Mettrie (1709–1751) took up arms against Descartes’ dualistic metaphysics
andproposedtosimplyeliminateonehalfofthebinaryopposition,resolving
both mind and matter into a single materialistic formula. In his soon to be
notorious (Man the Machine), written in 1748, book L’Homme Machine he
pushed the point: “Since all the faculties of the soul depend to such a degree
ontheproperorganizationofthebrainandofthewholebodythatapparently
they are this organization itself, the soul is clearly an enlightened machine.”7
In this era, to call the soul a machine – enlightened or otherwise – meant
that you believed all of its thoughts and behaviors were products of the same
impersonal laws of matter and motion that had been shown by the great
Isaac Newton to govern the stars and planets. For every Alexander Pope who
celebrated the clarifying intellectual power of Newton’s accomplishments
(“Nature and Nature’s laws lay hid in night; God said, ‘let Newton be,’
the eighteenth-century work of Thomas Willis. See, among other works, Georges Canguilhem, La
formation du concept de r´ eﬂexe au XVIIe et XVIIIe si` ecle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955).
5 This quotation and the quotation from Descartes in the previous paragraph were cited in Daniel
Robinson, The Enlightened Machine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 12.
6 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1926), pp. 83–4.
7 Julien Offrey de la Mettrie, Histoire naturelle de l’ame (A La Haye: Chez Jean Neaulme, 1745).P1: JYD
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and all was Light”), there was a Friedrich Schiller who shuddered at the
deterministic prison it appeared to make of the universe (“Like the dead
stroke of the pendulum, Nature – bereft of gods – slavishly serves the law of
gravity”). Good or bad, in the late eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant came
forward to insist that actually, in the case of living creatures – including and
especially human beings – Newtonian categories of mechanistic causality fell
short. To make sense of the presenting realities of life and mind, Kant said,
humanjudgmentwasforcedtopostulateanotherprincipleofcausality,which
he called “natural purpose” (“Naturzwecke”). This was a form of explanation
in which the working parts of an organism were to be understood in terms
of the teleology or purposive functioning of the organism as a whole.8
For a time, this piece of the Kantian legacy would offer a touchstone to
a new generation of researchers who aimed to ﬁnd a “third way” between
Cartesian theistic dualism on the one side and crude materialistic reduction-
ism on the other. Figures such as Karl Ernst von Baer and Johannes M¨ uller
in Germany and Thomas Laycock in England worked within a naturalistic
framework that historian Timothy Lenoir has characterized as “teleological
mechanism” – a framework that had room for at least some of those unsta-
ble conceptual categories identiﬁed by Whitehead that since the seventeenth
century had haunted the fault line between those two monoliths of our
metaphysics, “mind” and “matter.”9
THE PIANO THAT PLAYS ITSELF: FROM
GALL TO HELMHOLTZ
By the early nineteenth century, however, this ﬁrst antireductionist science
of mind, life, brain, and body would come under increasingly successful
attack by a new generation of workers. The story here is complex, internally
contentious,andnotseamless.Onestrandbeginsatthestartofthenineteenth
century with the work of Franz Joseph Gall, who would become renowned
(and also derided) for his system of “organology” or phrenology. This system
was rooted in three fundamental principles: The brain is the organ of the
mind (not an obvious proposition at the time); the brain is a composite of
parts, each of which serves a distinct mental “faculty”; and the sizes of the
differentpartsofthebrain,asassessedchieﬂybyexaminingthebumpsonthe
skull, correspond to the relative strengths of the different faculties served.10
8 See Clark Zumbach, The Transcendent Science: Kant’s Conception of Biological Methodology, Nijhoff
International Philosophy Series, vol. 15 (The Hague: Nijhoff; Boston: Kluwer, 1984).
9 Timothy Lenoir, The Strategy of Life: Teleology and Mechanics in Nineteenth-Century German Biology
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982).
10 Franz Josef Gall, On the Functions of the Brain and Each of Its Parts, trans. W. Lewis, 6 vols. (Boston:
Marsh, Capen and Lyon, 1835). To track the further development of phrenological thinking, see
J. G. Spurzheim, Phrenology or the Doctrine of the Mental Phenomena, 2nd American. (Philadelphia:P1: JYD
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Gall was certainly not the ﬁrst to interest himself in the relationship
between organic structure and different aspects of psychic activity in the
brain. Before Gall, the philosopher-naturalist Charles Bonnet had gone so
far as to declare that anyone who thoroughly understood the structure of the
brainwouldbeabletoreadallthethoughtspassingthroughit“asinabook.”
Bonnet,though,workinginaCartesianmode,hadimaginedthebrain’spre-
sumed different organs as vehicles that the immaterial soul manipulated at
will, like a pianist at the keyboard. Where Gall most clearly broke from his
predecessorswasinhisdecisiontoeliminatethispianist,thisoverrulingsoul,
and posit instead a brain composed of some thirty self-animated organs that
together generated the totality of the human mind and personality. Within
Gall’s system, the piano was to play itself.
Originally ridiculed in the historical literature as a pseudoscience of
“bump-reading,” the past thirty years have witnessed a partial rehabilitation
of phrenology, both as an approach to brain–behavior relations that primed
the pump for enduring work to come and as an anticlerical and politically
potentforcethatexpresseditselfininstitutionalsitesrangingfromtheasylum
to the popular lecture hall.11
For the purposes of this chapter, however, it will sufﬁce to emphasize a
differentkindofpoint:thatGall’sworkcontributedtoand,evenmore,exem-
pliﬁed a spreading approach to mind–brain relations characterized by two
interconnected strategic principles: (1) to break mind down to its functional
building blocks is to know it, and (2) if you can ground a piece of mind in
its presumed corresponding piece of brain, then you can claim it for science.
Thiswaytotruthwasnotanecessaryone(adifferentapproach,forexample,
would be chosen by evolutionary biology), but it did help launch empirical
programs both in the laboratory and the clinic that would prove highly pro-
ductive.12 Indeed, with the advent of new “imaging” technologies that allow
one to “see” different parts of the living brain “light up” in response to tasks
and stimuli, the approach is more alive than ever.
Whatever challenge Gall and his ilk offered to Christian dualistic theolo-
gies, one thing this ﬁrst generation of workers rarely, if ever, seriously ques-
tionedwastheKantianinsistencethatlivingorganismsneedtobeunderstood
teleologically: that the characteristics of mind are not just products of causes
Lippincott, 1908). For a sense of what, at the time, represented the most trenchant critique of this
approach to the brain, see J. P. M. Flourens, Phrenology Examined, trans. C.L. Meigs (Philadelphia:
Hogan and Thompson, 1846).
11 For one of the ﬁrst serious intellectual analyses of phrenology, see Robert Young, Mind, Brain,
and Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970). For some studies of
phrenology from a cultural and political perspective, see Steven Shapin, “Homo phrenologicus:
Anthropological Perspectives on an Historical Problem,” in Natural Order: Historical Studies of
Scientiﬁc Culture, ed. Barry Barnes and Steven Shapin (London: Sage, 1979), pp. 41–71; Roger
Cooter, The Cultural Meaning of Popular Science: Phrenology and the Organization of Consent in
Nineteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
12 This is a point developed by Susan Leigh Star in her book Regions of the Mind: Brain Research and
the Quest for Scientiﬁc Certainty (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1989).P1: JYD
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but are what they are for reasons. A broader shift away from this kind of
approach to mind and brain began to gather force in the late 1840s (iron-
ically, during the same time that new evolutionary ideas were reinstating
concerns with functional utility elsewhere in the life sciences). We can track
theshiftbyfollowingtheriseandgrowinginﬂuenceofacloselyknitgroupof
“organic physicists” working in Germany – Hermann von Helmholtz, Emil
du Bois-Reymond, Ernst Br¨ ucke, and Karl Ludwig. These were men who
had come of age under the inﬂuence of the “teleological mechanists” and
had also together resolved to rebel against their teachers – seeking instead to
build a science in which all explanations of living processes would ultimately
ﬁnd translation into the new causal-material understandings of the physical
sciences. As these men famously put it in 1847:
[N]ootherforcesthanthecommonphysical-chemicalonesareactivewithin
the organism. In those cases which cannot be explained by these forces, one
has either to ﬁnd the speciﬁc way or form of their action by means of the
physical mathematical method or to assume new forces equal in dignity to
the chemical-physical forces inherent in matter, reducible to the forces of
attraction and repulsion.13
From the synthesis of organic substances such as urea in the labora-
tory, to the establishment of cell theory, to new mechanistic understand-
ings of embryological development, a series of milestone events in the mid-
nineteenth century acted together to invest the biophysicists’ cause with
considerable momentum. Of all of the apparent success stories, however,
none was more historically salient for the vision than the establishment in
thelate1840softhelawofconservationofenergy,ortheﬁrstlawofthermody-
namics,associatedespeciallywithphysiologist-turned-physicistHelmholtz.14
“The law in question,” explained Helmholtz in an 1862 popular lecture on
thetopic,“assertsthatthequantityofforcewhichcanbebroughtintoaction
in the whole of Nature is unchangeable, and can neither be increased nor
diminished.” In other words, all forms of energy (mechanical, kinetic, ther-
mal) were equivalent and could be transformed into one another. There
was nothing special, nothing “extra” that was needed to understand life,
including the lives and minds of human beings. As the medical physiologist
Rudolf Virchow put matters in 1858: “[T]he same kind of electrical process
takes place in the nerve as in the telegraph line; the living body generates its
warmth through combustion just as warmth is generated in the oven; starch
is transformed into sugar in the plant and animal just as it is in a factory.”15
13 Cited in M. Leichtman, “Gestalt Theory and the Revolt against Positivism,” in Psychology in Social
Context, ed. A. Buss (New York: Irvington, 1979), pp. 47–75, quotation from note at p. 70.
14 Hermann von Helmholtz, ¨ Uber die Erhaltung der Kraft: Eine physikalische Abhandlung (Berlin:
George Reimar, 1847).
15 Rudolf Virchow, “On the Mechanistic Interpretation of Life [1858],” in Rudolf Virchow, Disease,
Life,andMan:SelectedEssaystranslatedandwithintroductionbyLellandJ.Rather(Stanford,Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 102–19, quotation at p. 115.P1: JYD
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IMAGINING BUILDING BLOCKS: FROM LANGUAGE
TO REFLEX
Even as the biophysicists were gaining ground from their base within the
German-speaking countries, a revised vision of the brain as a collection of
modular mental functions would begin to ﬁnd a new life in Descartes’ birth-
place, France. In the 1860s, the French neuroanatomist and anthropologist
PaulBrocausedcertainclinico-anatomicevidencetopersuadehiscolleagues,
and much of the international scientiﬁc community, that at least one of the
phrenological mental faculties – the “faculty of articulate language” – in fact
had a discrete “seat” in the brain, and that this seat lay in the third frontal
convolution of the (as became more clear a few years later, exclusively left)
frontal lobe of the human cortex.16
There is a lot that is not obvious about Broca’s ability to turn the tide of
international opinion in favor of a localizationist approach to brain function
when opinion had been so solidly opposed to it for almost two generations
preceding. On the face of things, the elements with which he had to work do
not appear particularly auspicious: a small handful of patient cases, mostly
of older people whose multiple ailments clouded the clinical presentation
of speech loss, murky autopsy data that required considerable equivocation
to make the evidence “come out right,” and critics standing ready with
apparently more plentiful and less ambiguous counterevidence. To bring
this success story into focus, a rich “contextual” reading therefore appears
necessary. The language localization efforts, for example, were undertaken
duringatimeinFrancewhenrepublicanismwasontheriseandthemonarchy
and Catholic Church were on the defensive. Thus, the French neurologist
Pierre Marie, at the turn of the new century, recalled how medical students
in France had quickly seized on the new doctrine of localizationism because,
by its materialistic radicalness and distastefulness to the older generation, it
seemed to represent scientiﬁc progress, free thought, and liberal politics. In
Marie’s words: “For a while, among the students, faith in localization was
made part of the Republican credo.”17
16 Paul Broca, “Remarques sur le si` ege de la facult´ e du langage articul´ e, suivies d’une observation
d’aph´ emie (perte de la parole),” Bulletins de la Soci´ et´ e Anatomique, 36 (1861), 330–57; Paul Broca,
“Du si` ege de la facult´ e du langage articul´ e,” Bulletins de la Soci´ et´ e d’Anthropologie, 6 (1865), 377–93;
AnneHarrington,Medicine,MindandtheDoubleBrain(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,
1987).
17 Pierre Marie, “Revision de la question de l’aphasie: L’aphasie de 1861 ` a 1866; essai de critique
historique sur la gen` ese de la doctrine de Broca,” Semaine m´ edicale (1906), 565–71; Harrington,
Medicine,MindandtheDoubleBrain,pp.36–49.Forstudiesinothernationalcontextsthatreinforce
a similar point about broader political resonances between politics and studies of the brain and
physiology, see Stephen Jacyna, “The Physiology of Mind, the Unity of Nature, and the Moral
Order in Victorian Thought,” British Journal of the History of Science, 14 (1981), 109–32; P. J. Pauly,
“The Political Structure of the Brain: Cerebral Localization in Bismarckian Germany,” International
Journal of Neuroscience, 21 (1983), 145–50.P1: JYD
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The language localization success story also comes into clearer focus when
one locates it inside a larger effort within French racial anthropology of the
time to determine the biological bases of the “known” mental differences
existing among the different races. One widely accepted assertion from this
work held that members of the allegedly evolutionarily superior white Euro-
pean races also possessed a considerably more developed frontal area than
the “primitive” nonwhite human races, who were supposed to have larger
posterior brain regions. Broca’s close colleague, the French neuroanatomist
PierreGratiolet,hadgonesofarastoclassifytheCaucasian,Mongoloid,and
Negroid races in terms of their allegedly dominant brain regions: as “frontal
race,” “parietal race,” and “occipital race,” respectively.
Given this, we can begin to see why Broca might have been so motivated
to seek the seat of a faculty such as language (used to such stunning effect
by fellow Europeans from Shakespeare to Voltaire to Goethe) in the frontal
lobes. And we can also begin to appreciate the logic whereby the ultimate
localization of articulate language in the frontal region of the left hemisphere
alone (and the corresponding brain-based link made between language and
right-handedness) would contribute to a broader discourse in which the
brain’s right hemisphere became the “savage,” the “female,” the “mad,” and
the “animal” side of the brain. We are here concerned with a “brain” that is
functioninginpartasaﬂexiblesymbolicresource,aconcretemetaphorforthe
carryingoutofasociety’smoralandpoliticalwork.Parenthetically,thiswould
be no less true in the 1970s, when the “split-brain” operations, associated
with the work of people such as Roger Sperry, Joseph Bogen, and Michael
Gazzaniga, reopened questions about our brain’s two hemispheres and their
possible different “cognitive styles” (see also the section on “Technological
Imperatives”).18
Now the plot thickens further. Back in the 1820s, anatomists Charles Bell
and Franc ¸ois Magendie together had demonstrated that the spinal cord was
functionallydual,withtheposteriornervesactingasachannelfor(incoming)
sensoryinformationandtheanteriornervesactingasachannelfor(outgoing)
motorresponses.Inthisway,thesemenhelpedestablishanapparentmaterial
basis in the nervous system for “reﬂex” action. An important project of the
1830s and 1840s focused on systematically extending the new sensory-motor
reﬂex model of nervous functioning to ever higher levels of the nervous
system. The cerebral cortex itself, however, had been exempted from this
creeping colonization, honored as a more or less mysterious physiological
18 Harrington,Medicine,MindandtheDoubleBrain,especiallychaps.2and3.Forafullersenseofhow
racial concerns played themselves out in these debates, see P. Broca, “Discussion sur la perfectibilit´ e
des races,” Bulletins de la Soci´ et´ e d’Anthropologie, 1 (1860), 337–42. For a useful introduction to the
largercontextofbrainresearchandracializinganthropology,seeStephenJayGould,TheMismeasure
of Man (Middlesex: Penguin, 1981).P1: JYD
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terrain that serviced “mental” functions. In localizing language, Broca
accepted this view as much as anyone else.19
Then, in the 1870s, two German researchers, Gustav Fritsch and Eduard
Hitzig, demonstrated that the cerebral cortex also plays a role in sensory-
motor activity. Applying electrical currents to the brains of dogs, the two
Germans were able to produce crude movements of the body, and found
moreover that speciﬁc brain regions seemed responsible for speciﬁc move-
ments.20 Now,ifthecortexpossessed“motorcenters,”asFritschandHitzig’s
work suggested, then it was logical to suppose, by analogy with the workings
of spinal and subcortical structures, that it possessed sensory centers as well.
And indeed the effort to identify these cortical motor and sensory centers
in laboratory animals dominated experimental physiology in the last three
decades of the nineteenth century. Parts of this work would ultimately not
only advance laboratory research agendas, but help lay the foundations for
the rise of neurosurgery at the end of the century.21
Butwhatdidthiskindoflocalizationworkimplyfortheefforttocorrelate
mind with matter? Could it be true, as the English neurologist David Ferrier
said in 1874, that “mental operations in the last analysis must be merely the
subjective side of sensory-motor substrata?”22 In the 1870s, a young German
psychiatrist named Carl Wernicke attempted an answer to this question in a
way that also explicitly gestured back to the biophysicists’ dream of creating
an explanatory language for mind and brain that looked ultimately to the
explanatory languages of the physical sciences for its orientation.
This is how it all worked. Using the anatomy of sensory-motor “pro-
jections” established in the anatomy lab by his teacher Theodor Meynert,
Wernicke envisioned a cortex in which the back was specialized for process-
ing and storing sensory data, and the front consisted of motor projections
and centers. Within this schema, the form of language loss associated with
“Broca’s area” was reconceptualized as a “motor” deﬁcit, while Wernicke
posited a more fundamental, sensory basis for language comprehension and
generation in the (posterior) temporal region of the brain. Language and
rationalthoughtweregeneratedwithinthisbrainthroughhypothesizedphys-
icalist processes, whose varied forms of breakdown could be charted using
paper and pencil. Sensory-motor centers were supposed to communicate
19 For a good introduction to the intellectual issues at stake in the reﬂex story, see Clarke and Jacyna,
Nineteenth-Century Origins of Neuroscientiﬁc Concepts. For an analysis of the place of reﬂex theory
within a larger set of culturally resonant debates about control, inhibition, and regulation, see Roger
Smith, Inhibition: History and Meaning in the Sciences of Mind and Brain (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992).
20 G. Fritsch and E. Hitzig ¨ Uber die elektrische Erregbarkeit des Grosshirns [1870]. English translation in
Some Papers on the Cerebral Cortex, trans. Gerhardt von Bonin (Springﬁeld, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas,
1960).
21 D. Rioch, “David Ferrier,” in Founders of Neurology, ed. W. Haymaker and F. Schiller, 2nd
ed. (Springﬁeld, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1970), pp. 195–8.
22 David Ferrier, The Functions of the Brain [1876] (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1966).P1: JYD
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withoneanotheralong“associationﬁbers,”exchanging“impressions”likeso
many electrical pulses along a telegraph line and combining in accordance
with the established psychological “laws of association.” For a new gener-
ation, this way of thinking about the brain – parsimonious, monistic, and
predictive – would feel like a coming of age. It would lay the foundations for
asylum-based research into a whole slew of newly conceived discrete brain
disorders (the aphasias, the agnosias, the apraxias), an effort that old-timers
would later nostalgically remember as a “golden era” in the history of clinical
exploration of higher brain function.
ELECTRICITY, ENERGY, AND THE NERVOUS SYSTEM
FROM GALVANI TO SHERRINGTON
Nevertheless, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Spanish neu-
roanatomistSantiagoRamonyCajalrecognizedafundamentalshortcoming
in the localization theories of his time: “However excellent, every physiolog-
ical doctrine of the brain based on localizations leaves us absolutely in the
dark over the detailed mechanisms of the psychological acts.” Cajal’s histo-
logical work identifying different types of nerve cells and the geography of
their connections would, on the one hand, take the localizationist project of
“mapping” the nervous system to a new level. However, he recognized that
knowledge of the intricate anatomy he was untangling needed to be accom-
panied by an understanding of the “nature of the nervous wave, the energy
transformations which it brings about or suffers at the moment when it is
borne.”23
As early as the mid-eighteenth century, conﬁdence had been growing that
the nervous force would turn out to be electrical in nature.The larger story
to be told here does more than take us into the early history of what would
become electrophysiology. It also opens doors for us into a series of tangled
Enlightenment and Romantic era debates about the relationship between
the organic and the inorganic, man and the cosmos, and brings esoteric
science and popular culture into a common conversation over the efﬁcacy
and meaning of new therapeutic practices that began to circulate under the
name of “animal magnetism” or mesmerism.24
23 Ramon y Cajal, “Anatomical and Physiological Considerations about the Brain,” in Some Papers on
the Cerebral Cortex, ed. and trans. G. von Bonin (Springﬁeld, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1960), p. 275.
24 For more, see Robert Darnton, Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); Adam Crabtree, From Mesmer to Freud: Magnetic Sleep and
the Roots of Psychological Healing (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993); and portions of
Alan Gauld, A History of Hypnotism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). For the later
(and largely unknown) continuing history here, which locates the theme within later developments
inFrenchcultureandinstitutionalizedneurophysiologyandpsychiatry,seeAnneHarrington,“Hys-
teria, Hypnosis and the Lure of the Invisible: The Rise of Neo-Mesmerism in Fin-de-Si` ecle French
Psychiatry,” in The Anatomy of Madness: Essays in the History of Psychiatry, Vol. 3: The Asylum andP1: JYD
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For our purposes, we must leave that story aside and identify a more
conventional reference point in the historical record: 1791, the year that
Luigi Galvani in Italy came out in print with experiments that he believed
haddemonstratedthatthenervescontainedintrinsicelectricity.Inthisclassic
work, a frog’s leg was pierced and held by a brass hook through the thigh.
When at rest, the foot would drop to make contact with a silver strip. On
contact, a current was created, causing the leg muscles to contract and the
foot to lift. This broke the current, causing the leg to drop again to the silver
strip.
Galvani’s interpretation of the meaning of this experiment was challenged
by his Italian colleague Alessandro Volta. Volta felt that Galvani had not
demonstrated the existence of an inherent animal electricity but merely
revealed the possibility of creating an electric current between dissimilar
metals (the brass hook and silver strip) separated by a moist medium (the
frog’s ﬂesh). He could produce the same kind of phenomenon, he showed,
using what he called an “artiﬁcial electric organ” – disks of different metals
separated by pasteboard sheets soaked in brine, or the ﬁrst wet-cell battery.25
Galvani’s work may not have been deﬁnitive, but others – again, with the
Italians taking an early lead – would make the case more deﬁnitively. Then,
in the 1840s, du Bois-Reymond clinched the case with his work illustrating
“negative variation” in the nerve: action potential that generated a constant
current following nerve stimulation. Du Bois-Reymond’s contemporary von
Helmholtzthenwentontomeasurethespeedofneuralelectricalconduction
andfounditsurprisinglyslow–amereeighty-ﬁvemilesperhour.26 Notonly
had the nervous energy been domesticated inside the conceptual categories
and experimental apparatus of nineteenth-century physics; it was looking
positively tame.
Meanwhile, conceptualization of the matter of the cellular architecture of
the nervous system was growing through the assiduous work of histologists.
CamilloGolgiinthe1870susedsilverstainingtovisualizenervecellsatnewly
high levels of deﬁnition, and he felt the evidence argued for a nervous system
that functioned as a continuous network (the “reticular theory”). But Cajal,
working at around the same time, disagreed. He thought the microscopic
evidence showed that nerve cells were not linked but rather were discrete
entities that communicated with one another by some yet to be determined
process(the“neuronaltheory”).Cajal’sviewwouldwintheday,anditwould
provide a foundation for relating the anatomy and physiology of the nervous
Its Psychiatry, ed. W. F. Bynum, R. Porter, and M. Shepherd (London: Tavistock Press, 1988),
pp. 226–46.
25 Marcello Pera, The Ambiguous Frog: The Galvani-Volta Controversy on Animal Electricity, trans.
Jonathan Mandelbaum (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
26 Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992), pp. 66, 93.P1: JYD
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system in new, more integrated ways. Suddenly, one could begin to see how
electrical messages passing through the physical architecture of the nervous
system might be purposefully directed, diverted, inhibited, and augmented
at different neuronal junctions, like a train having its course set and reset at
various railroad switch points.27
Thepotentialofneuronaltheorybegantoberealizedearlyinthetwentieth
century with the work of physiologist Charles Sherrington. Working with
dogs, Sherrington aimed to map the complex pathway taken by an electrical
nerve impulse as it moved from a sensory receptor on the periphery (in this
case,atactilereceptorontheskin)intothespinalcordandbrain,andbackout
over a motor pathway to produce a response (scratching). These studies led
himtoawayofthinkingthatemphasizedhowreﬂexactionatonelevelofthe
nervous system could modify (stimulate or inhibit) reﬂex action at another
level.28 These processes were understood to result from interactions between
electrical impulses and modulatory chemical signals emitted at individual
nerve junctions (that Sherrington named “synapses”).
During these same years, in Russia, physiologist Ivan Petrovich Pavlov
(1849–1936) built on these new physiologically grounded understandings of
reﬂex in another way, highlighting a crucial distinction between what came
to be called conditioned reﬂex actions and unconditioned reﬂex actions (dogs
salivating in the presence of meat powder versus dogs salivating when they
hear a bell that had previously been merely paired with meat powder). This
work helped set the stage for the emergence of behaviorist approaches to
Anglo-American and Russian psychology during the early years of the twen-
tieth century – approaches that, ironically enough, would largely eliminate
considerations of brain and biology from the experimental picture in order
to focus on clarifying strategies of prediction and control of behavior.29
Yet back in England, surveying the results of a lifetime of physiological
work, Sherrington had concluded that none of these new understandings
of low-level nervous functioning – to which he had so fundamentally con-
tributed – had anything to say about high-level processes such as mind and
consciousness. These, he insisted – to the dismay of at least some of his col-
leagues – had a soul-like reality that transcended the physical. It was evident
that, even in the twentieth century, data from the clinic and laboratory alone
27 Santiago Ramon y Cajal, Neuron Theory or Reticular Theory? Objective Evidence of the Anatomical
Unity of Nerve Cells, trans. M. Ubeda Purkiss and Clement A. Fox (Madrid: Consejo Superior de
Investigaciones Cientiﬁcas, Instituto Ramon y Cajal, 1954).
28 RogerSmithhasimpressivelyexploredthebroaderculturalandsemanticﬁeldwithinwhichconcepts
of inhibition were developed and played out in physiology, psychiatry, and elsewhere and discusses
Sherrington’s work in that context. See Roger Smith, Inhibition: History and Meaning in the Sciences
of Mind and Brain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
29 Robert A. Boakes, From Darwin to Behaviourism: Psychology and the Minds of Animals Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984); John A. Mills, Control: A History of Behavioral Psychology (New
York: New York University Press, 1998).P1: JYD
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were not going to be sufﬁcient to resolve ongoing debates about the ﬁnal
nature of our humanness.30
HAUNTED BY OUR PAST: THE BRAIN IN
EVOLUTIONARY TIME
If studies of the brain in the late nineteenth century served as one important
lightning rod for debates about our nature and fate as human beings, their
importancecertainlywouldbematched,ifnotbested,bythenewevolution-
ary ideas associated with Charles Darwin. But how did the two traditions
interact? Alfred Russel Wallace – cofounder with Darwin of the theory of
evolution by natural selection – introduced a note of tension into the rela-
tionship early on by suggesting that, in fact, the human brain represented
a dilemma for the new evolutionary theory because it was capable – even
in “savages” – of far greater feats of intellectual prowess and acts of ethical
reﬁnement than would have been required for mere survival. It was there-
fore difﬁcult to see how it could be a product of mere natural selection. It
was as if, instead, the brain had been “prepared” in advance (perhaps by an
“Overruling Intelligence”) in such a way as to enable the subsequent ﬂow-
ering of human civilization. Charles Darwin’s own comments on Wallace’s
actions here deserve to be recalled I hope, he told his friend, that you have
not “murdered yours and my child” too completely.31
More consistent with the secular, anticlerical temper of the day was the
virtuoso 1874 lecture by Thomas Henry Huxley “On the Hypothesis that
Animals are Automata and Its History,” which brought together reﬂex the-
oryandevolutionarytheorytoargueforashockinglymodernmetaphysicsof
mind–body relations. This “conscious automata” theory denied any efﬁca-
cious place for consciousness or “free will” in human life. The view here was
thatconsciousnesssimplyaccompaniesusinourliveslike“thesteam-whistle
which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine.”32
30 Charles Scott Sherrington Integrative Action of the Nervous System [1906], 2nd ed. (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961); Charles Scott Sherrington, Man on His Nature [1940], Gifford
Lectures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951).
31 Alfred Russel Wallace, The Limits of Natural Selection as Applied to Man [1870], reprinted in
Alfred Russel Wallace, Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection (London: Macmillan, 1875),
pp.332–72.ForasympatheticcontextualizingofWallace’sstory,seeLorenEiseley,Darwin’sCentury:
Evolution and the Men Who Discovered It (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1958). The quotation from
Darwin was also cited from this source.
32 Thomas Huxley, “On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata and Its History,” Fortnightly
Review, 22 (1874), 199–245, quotation at p. 236. For a general orientation to the story of evolutionary
approaches to the human mind, see Robert J. Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary
Theories of Mind and Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). On ideological rela-
tions between evolutionary theory and brain science, see Robert Young, “The Historiographic and
Ideological Contexts of the 19th-Century Debate on Man’s Place in Nature,” in Darwin’s Metaphor:
Nature’sPlaceinVictorianCulture,ed.RobertYoung(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1985),
pp. 164–71, 219–47.P1: JYD
9780521572019c27 CUUS457/Bowler 978 0 521 57201 9 August 9, 2008 7:29
The Brain and the Behavioral Sciences 517
Meanwhile, in some quarters, the following question began to be asked:
How could one begin to orient the empirical projects of the brain sciences
to do better justice to the fact that the brain, too, is not just an object in space
but an evolved process in time – a four-dimensional entity? A way of thinking
about this problem would ultimately be found in an image of hierarchy. The
British neurologist John Hughlings Jackson in the 1870s had been among
the ﬁrst to articulate clearly the idea that different levels of the brain might
serve as a kind of archaeological record of the biological history of a species,
with lower and higher levels corresponding to earlier and later phases of
evolutionary development.33
But that was not all. Jackson’s temporal view of brain functioning was also
predicated on the assumption that more recently evolved layers of function –
in humans, associated with rational thought and moral control – were the
mostvulnerableones.Thismeantthat,incasesofshockordamage,themore
reﬁned layers broke down ﬁrst, and one was then witness to a welling up of
the suddenly unmasked primitive levels of brain functioning. “Dissolution”
was Hughlings Jackson’s term for this cascading down the nervous system
to more primitive automatic and emotional states of functioning. In an era
of growing social unrest, this was a model of brain functioning destined to
embed itself in larger political concerns of the day. When Jackson’s colleague
HenryMaudsleyimaginedtheunregulated“lowercentres”ofthebraintobe
“like the turbulent, aimless action of a democracy without a head,” he was
only one of many to worry that outbursts of animalistic physiology might
account for everything from street riots to crimes of passion.
Inpsychiatricasylums,ideaslikethesecametoserveasimportantresources
for a renewed effort to see madness as a medical disorder with a biological
underpinning, and thereby to reassert the status of asylum psychiatry as a
medicalscience,whenithadbeenincreasinglydenigratedsincethelatenine-
teenthcenturyasamerecustodialprofession.WhatShortercallstheeraofthe
“ﬁrst biological psychiatry”34 had a strong hereditarian orientation that came
in a distinctively fatalistic ﬂavor – biology was destiny, as the materialists had
long insisted, but sick biology, “degenerate” biology, was perhaps especially
so. It was not really until the 1940s that biological psychiatry would start to
be identiﬁed with a slew of biological interventions, from shock treatment to
surgery,35 and not until the 1960s that the current identiﬁcation of biological
psychiatry with pharmaceutical interventions would begin to take hold.
It is true that by the second decade of the twentieth century, especially in
the United States, optimistic social engineering programs would join forces
33 The best single introduction to Jackson’s thought is John Hughlings Jackson, Selected Writings of
John Hughlings Jackson, ed. J. Taylor, 2 vols. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932).
34 Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac (New York:
Wiley, 1997).
35 ElliotS.Valenstein,GreatandDesperateCures:TheRiseandDeclineofPsychosurgeryandotherRadical
Treatments for Mental Illness (New York: Basic Books, 1986).P1: JYD
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both with behaviorist thinking in psychology and with an Americanized
interpretation of psychoanalysis to make a strong counterargument for the
capacity of proper socialization and education to ameliorate human vulner-
abilities (the “mental hygiene” movement). Nevertheless, even within this
new cultural setting, the older Darwinian-inspired image of mind as an
unstablestrugglebetween“higher”and“lower”levelswouldpersistincovert
ways.Itwouldbeincorporated,forexample,intothepsychoanalyticconcept
of “regression” and serve as the rationale for the psychoanalytic distinction
betweenprimaryandsecondarymentalprocesses,expressedbyFreudhimself
in the vivid image of the conscious, rational ego struggling to maintain some
sort of check over the unconscious, passion-driven “id.”36
Backinthemoreesotericworldofuniversitylaboratoryresearch,thebasic
visionofa“higher”mindfunctioningasaninhibitoryforceoverthe“animal”
below would continue to leave its imprint on emerging mid-century under-
standings of the brain. A high-proﬁle laboratory program headed by John
FultonatYaleUniversitystudiedhierarchicalprocessesofinhibitionanddis-
inhibitioninthebrain,allconceptualizedwithinanevolutionaryframework.
Building on the work of anatomist James Papez, one of the members of this
laboratoryteamatYale,physicianandphysiologistPaulMacLean,conceptu-
alized a system of integrated subcortical brain structures that he felt acted as
the“emotional”centerofthebrain–mediatingsurvival-enhancingbehavior,
includingdrivestomateandcareforone’syoung,andactinginotherrespects
very much like a Freudian instinct-driven unconscious. MacLean ultimately
called this system the “limbic system.”37
Evolutionary thinking shaped brain science thinking in a somewhat dif-
ferent way with the work of Harvard psychophysiologist Walter Bradford
Cannon on the role of the sympathetic-adrenal system in the arousal pro-
cessesassociatedwiththe“ﬁghtorﬂight”emotions(especiallyrageandfear).
Cannon saw this part of the nervous system as one half of a regulatory sys-
tem(theotherhalfwouldbecalledthe“parasympatheticsystem”)involvedin
maintainingastateofresponsivebalanceor“homeostasis”intheorganismas
awhole.Beginninginthelate1950s,theCannon“ﬁghtorﬂight”modelwould
be pressed into service as an organizing framework for a remarkably complex
tangle of science, clinical practice, and cultural moralizing about a new psy-
chophysiological experience called “stress” – now discovered in everything
36 Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id [1927], trans. Joan Riviere (London: Hogarth Press, 1949).
37 See Walter B. Cannon, Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage [1919], 2nd ed. (1929); J. W.
Papez, “A Proposed Mechanism of Emotion,” Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 33 (1937), 725–43;
Paul MacLean, “Psychosomatic Disease and the ‘Visceral’ Brain: Recent Developments Bearing on
the Papez Theory of Emotion,” Psychosomatic Medicine, 11 (1949), 338–53; Paul MacLean, “Man’s
Reptilian and Limbic Inheritance,” in A Triune Concept of the Brain and Behavior: The Hincks
Memorial Lectures, ed. T. Boag and D. Campbell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973),
pp. 6–22. A useful overview of the basic issues here is also provided in John Durant, “The Science
of Sentiment: The Problem of the Cerebral Localization of Emotion,” in Perspectives in Ethology,
Vol.6:Mechanisms,eds.P.P.G.BatesonandP.H.Klopfer(NewYork:PlenumPress,1985),pp.1–31.P1: JYD
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from monkeys who developed ulcers in laboratory settings, to “Type A”
executives in corporate boardrooms ripe for heart attacks.38
THE SUBJECT STRIKES BACK: HYSTERIA AND HOLISM
Even as everything seemed to be going well for the expansionist ambitions of
the brain sciences, there were also some growing cracks in the larger citadel.
The “subject,” who was to be domesticated within the current conceptual
categories of brain anatomy and physiology, was in a range of ways refusing
to lie down and behave the way she was supposed to.
Space permits us to do no more than gesture here in a couple of relevant
directions.Theﬁrstofthesetakesusbacktothelastdecadesofthenineteenth
century, to a time when Europe’s leading neurologist, Jean-Martin Charcot,
had resolved to bring the conceptual categories and clinical methodologies
of neurology to elucidate the physiological logic of one of his era’s most
bafﬂing disorders: hysteria. At ﬁrst, everything seemed to go well – even
brilliantly. Order began to emerge out of chaos. Symptoms were cataloged,
and physiological “laws” were described. Photographs were made of patients
to provide the evidence Charcot needed to prove – as he put it – that the
laws of hysteria that he had discovered were “valid for all countries, all times,
all races” and “consequently universal.”
But, as things unfolded, it turned out that this was a physiology whose
laws, far from being “universal,” were in the end so local that they basically
only unfolded inside the walls of Charcot’s asylum, the Salpˆ etri` ere. Using
hypnosis (which Charcot had also helped rehabilitate), rivals of Charcot
showed that one could reproduce all the symptoms of hysteria, and one
could also change them or make them disappear. As this came out little by
little, Charcot became a target of ridicule, and his disciples scattered. The
entire neurological ediﬁce of hysteria, rooted in the visible, the objective,
the universal, slowly crumbled – all of its contours now chalked up to some
invisible and obscure psychological process that people were beginning to
call “suggestion.”
In the space of confusion and humiliation that opened up here, people
such as Freud came in and reinterpreted hysteria not as a disease of the
“brain” but as a disease of the “mind.” And out of this moment of choice one
sees the rise of a new kind of Cartesian logic that would get variously insti-
tutionalized and elaborated through such twentieth-century distinctions as
“neuroses” versus “psychoses,” “psychiatry” versus “neurology,” “talking ther-
apies” versus “drugs,” and somatic disorders that are “all in your head” versus
38 Robert Kugelmann, Stress: The Nature and History of Engineered Grief (New York: Praeger, 1992);
Allan Young, The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1995); Harris Dienstfrey, Where the Mind Meets the Body (New York:
Harper Perennial, 1991).P1: JYD
9780521572019c27 CUUS457/Bowler 978 0 521 57201 9 August 9, 2008 7:29
520 Anne Harrington
somatic disorders that are “real.” We are still living today with the legacy of
those institutionalized metaphysical sortings. Nowhere is this more clearly
seen than in our current approaches to managing what is called “the placebo
effect.” We are so convinced of the power and ubiquity of this phenomenon
that we require all new drugs to be tested against dummy versions of
themselves; at the same time, we are committed to seeing all placebo effects
as “imaginary” or “unreal.”39
At about this same time, other kinds of discontents were afoot in the
neurology clinic. Particularly in the German-speaking countries, evidence
was being mobilized against the diagnostically useful model of mind and
brain functioning laid down by Wernicke and his generation. Much of the
energy fueling the opposition drew on the anomalies and challenges raised
for Wernicke’s model by the problem of “recovery” – the evidence for the
brain’s capacity to heal itself. Increasingly, it would be said that the simple
fact that brain-damaged people could get better over time, could regain lost
speechandmovement,wassimplyincompatiblewiththenineteenth-century
“machine” model of the nervous system as a purely mechanical apparatus
operatingaccordingtoﬁxedlawsofreﬂexandassociation.Theﬁghtingwords
were spoken: Machines did not repair themselves after suffering damage,
and functions that “resided” in certain ﬁxed regions of the brain could not
reappear if those brain regions had been permanently destroyed. For this
reason, and others, it had become clear that human beings were actually
“more than machines” – enlightened or otherwise (pace la Mettrie) – and
the brain and behavioral sciences of the future (these rebellious voices from
the clinic declared) were going to have to take into account all the ways in
which this was so.40
The 1920s began also to see laboratory-based challenges to the prevailing
view of the cortex as a hard-wired structure in which highly determined
nerve connections and brain areas served speciﬁc functions. The failure of
the American psychophysiologist Karl Lashley to ﬁnd any speciﬁc site in
the rat cortex where the memory (“engram”) of a learned behavior could be
localized helped usher in a “new view” of the cortex dominated by princi-
ples of functional “equipotentiality” and “mass action.” In the 1930s, work
on amphibians by Paul Weiss further suggested that when nerve centers to
limbs were cut and rearranged, orderly coordination could nevertheless be
reestablished.Thebrainintheseyears(inpartalsoforreasonsthathavetodo
39 A comprehensive historiographical introduction to this and other cuts through the hysteria story
can be found in Mark Micale, Approaching Hysteria: Disease and Its Interpretations (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1995). On placebos, see Anne Harrington, ed., The Placebo Effect: An
Interdisciplinary Exploration (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
40 For an extended discussion of this theme, see Anne Harrington, Reenchanted Science: Holism in
German Culture from Wilhelm II to Hitler (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Anne
Harrington, “Kurt Goldstein’s Neurology of Healing and Wholeness: A Weimar Story,” in Greater
than the Sum of Its Parts: Holistic Biomedicine in the Twentieth Century, ed. George Weisz and
Christopher Lawrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).P1: JYD
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with political and cultural congeniality) appeared to be a marvelously plastic
structure. Not biology but the environment – from family life to laboratory
conditioning – appeared to “call the shots” in the life of a mind and brain.41
TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVES AND THE MAKING
OF “NEUROSCIENCE”
That environmentalist perspective would only begin to change in the late
1950s when new projects in both the laboratory and the clinic began to argue
for the relativeincapacity of the brain to rewire itself after damage, and the
extenttowhichspeciﬁcfunctionsdid haveahard-wired“place”inthecortex.
Newtechnologies,newexperimentalparadigms,andrenewedculturalopen-
ness to interpreting ambiguous data all probably contributed to this swing
backtowardakindofbiologicaldeterminism.Onecomplexexpressioninthe
1970s was the explosion of interest in so-called split-brain research and later-
alized hemisphere functioning. California psychologist Roger Sperry and his
colleagues had ﬁrst studied epileptic patients in whom connections between
thecerebralhemisphereshadbeenseveredfortherapeuticreasons.Itappeared
that each severed hemisphere possessed a more or less independent sphere
of consciousness – often the left brain literally did not know what the right
was doing. Moreover, the two hemispheres responded to the environment
and computed information differently: The left hemisphere was specialized
for language and (some began to argue) for analytic, piecemeal thinking in
general; the right hemisphere was specialized for visual-spatial information
processing and (it was argued) “holistic” (creative, artistic) thinking in gen-
eral. These studies not only stimulated new kinds of research into higher
brain function; they also produced a (perhaps peculiarly American) cultural
dialogue on the relative virtues of what was called “left brain” versus “right
brain” thinking.42
Otherwise in the postwar era, technological innovation would soon drive
research at least as much as theoretical preoccupation. For example, with
the development of the microelectrode in the 1940s, much basic neurobio-
logical research went to the cellular level. In the 1960s, Harvard researchers
David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel used microelectrodes to record activity in
single nerve cells across the cellular columns of the primary visual area of the
cortex (the anatomy of which had been worked out by Johns Hopkins neu-
roanatomist Vernon Mountcastle). They stunned the research community
41 Karl S. Lashley, Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929). For
more on this era, see various autobiographical essays in Frederic G. Worden, Judith P. Swazey, and
George Adelman, The Neurosciences: Paths of Discovery (Boston: Birkh¨ auser, 1975).
42 For a useful overview of this literature and these events, see Sally Springer and Georg Deutsch, Left
Brain, Right Brain (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1993); Anne Harrington and G. Oepen, “‘Whole
brain’ Politics and Brain Laterality Research,” Archives of European Neurology, 239 (1989), 141–3.P1: JYD
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withtheirconclusionsthatdifferentindividualcells“saw”differentlyor,more
precisely, had different built-in capacities to respond to visual stimuli – what
they called “pattern speciﬁcity.” In other words, it seemed that the speciﬁc
instructions by which the brain came to know the world were written as far
down as the individual cell level.43
Beginning in the late 1980s, the dominant molecular focus in basic neu-
robiological research would begin to be partly overshadowed by excitement
over new neuroimaging technologies that promised insights into the contri-
butions made by speciﬁc neural structures to more global brain functioning.
Inthe1940s,SeymourKetyhadusednitrousoxidetotrackchangesincerebral
blood ﬂow, suggesting that there might be ways to watch the “living brain”
in action. This work was one step in a chain of technological developments
that ultimately led to the anatomical views created by computer tomography
(CT) and the dramatic colored brain pictures produced by positron emis-
sion technology (PET), and more recently by functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI). Slowly, a new sort of celebratory rhetoric, peppered with
“ﬁnalfrontier”imagery,spreadacrossthedisciplinarycultureofbrainscience.
In the end, the secrets of mind and brain would be resolved, not through
philosophical subtleties, but through new technological devices that would
allowustogoandseewherenoman(orwoman)hadgoneandseenbefore.44
Today, most brain and behavior science research is still sustained by a
commitment to playing for technological high stakes and a pride in its own
forward-looking identity. Brain science has “the future in its bones” (to recall
the famous line of C. P. Snow),45 and it knows it. Nevertheless – more than it
often likes to admit – the living ﬂesh and blood of its practices and thinking
remain fed by its discipline-divided and ethically contentious past. Despite
the high hopes of multidisciplinary integration envisioned in the 1960sb y
Francis Schmitt’s Neurosciences Research Project (NRP) – which led to the
coinage of this new word “neuroscience” – all the new projects and under-
standings do not map seamlessly onto one another. For example, updated
notions of hard-wired localization coexist with models of the nervous system
as a self-updating dynamic system of “neural nets” (work associated with
such names as Gerald Edelman).46 Models of mind developed within the
sanitized walls of computer science (so-called artiﬁcial intelligence) juggle
uneasily against models of mind thrashed out in the less regulated worlds
of primatology research and biological anthropology. Studies of the neuro-
chemistry of the nervous system – including the discovery in the1970so fth e
43 David H. Hubel, Eye, Brain, and Vision (New York: Scientiﬁc American Library, distributed by
W. H. Freeman, 1988).
44 Roger E. Kelley, ed., Functional Neuroimaging (Armonk, N.Y.: Futura, 1994).
45 Charles Percy Snow, The Two Cultures [original title: Two Cultures and the Scientiﬁc Revolution],
introduction by Stefan Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
46 Gerald M. Edelman, Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (New York: Basic
Books, 1987).P1: JYD
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endorphins, the brain’s “natural opiates” (by Solomon Snyder and Candace
Pert)47 – have led some to question the extent to which the nervous system
can even be properly said to exist as an independent entity. Perhaps instead
it will need to be reconceived as part of a more complex system of inter-
connected biochemical processes, including those that regulate endocrine
and immune functions. In this last vision, the “mind” emerges, not just as a
product of the brain, but in some sense of the entire human organism.
At the same time, ongoing political debates over possible brain-based
determinantsofsexualorientation,violence,intelligence,andsupposedmen-
tal disorders (from depression to attention-deﬁcit disorder) suggest that the
moving horizon of brain and mind research will continue to be drawn into
our society’s changing political and cultural imperatives and preoccupations.
Today, as in the past, our questions about what we think it means to be
human, and all the ways we think science can help us answer that question,
simply feel too urgent for us to keep them separate from – even if we want to
or think we should – our human lives, part of some imagined domesticated
world of disinterested inquiry alone.
47 Solomon H. Snyder, Brainstorming: The Science and Politics of Opiate Research (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1989).